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Abstract “All you can drink” specials are forbidden by law in several places.
Authorities claim that establishments tend to offer low quality drinks when they use
this type of promotion. In this paper, I elaborate a model to determine whether a
monopolist produces higher or lower quality goods when using buffet pricing (all you
can drink) instead of a two-part tariff. I find that the more profitable strategy is usually
associated with a higher quality good than the less profitable strategy. However, under
certain conditions buffet pricing is more profitable and leads to lower quality goods
than the alternative.
Keywords Drinks · Buffet · Two-part tariff · Quality
JEL Classification D42
1 Introduction
Some bars and night clubs charge customers a fixed fee to let them consume an unlim-
ited amount of drinks. For example, the hotel chain, Embassy Suites, offers unlimited
drinks for a limited period of time in early evening. This pricing strategy, usually
advertised as “all you can drink”, is forbidden by law in several places. For example,
this is the case in Mexican states like Baja California Sur, Querétaro and Zacatecas.
Among other reasons, authorities claim that establishments that sell alcohol tend to
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offer low quality drinks when they use this type of promotion.1 However, as far as I
know, no formal analysis has been conducted to support this statement.
An “all you can drink” special is equivalent to buffet pricing, which is defined by
Nahata et al. (1999) as the practice of charging customers a fixed entry fee and letting
them consume an unlimited amount during certain period of time. Although the word
buffet is usually associated to restaurants while “all you can drink” is related to bars
and night clubs, this pricing strategy and two-part tariffs are widely used in other
industries. For instance, some telephone companies offer unlimited local calls for a
fixed monthly fee, while others charge a fixed monthly fee in addition to a per-unit
price. Transportation services like taxis usually charge a fixed fee when the customer
gets into the vehicle and an additional charge related to the distance or time the trip
takes. On the other hand, buses usually charge a fixed amount regardless of time or
distance.
Although it is not obvious, there is a link between the theory of clubs and buffet
pricing. The theory developed by Buchanan (1965) studies consumption-ownership
arrangements of a common facility. The basic idea is to determine the optimal number
of persons that can share the benefits and costs of a semipublic good. On the other
hand, buffet or access pricing is one of the methods more frequently used to charge
for semipublic goods. For instance, Barro and Romer (1987) say that ski areas only
use this type of pricing.
According to Barro and Romer (1987), a uniform price, a two-part tariff or buffet
pricing can be equivalent if there are quantity constraints. In the case of ski-lift facil-
ities or amusement parks, the authors explain that each consumer does not face an
explicit constraint but congestion imposes an implicit constraint. A similar situation
takes place at bars and restaurants. In this sense, there is no way to determine which of
the alternative pricing methods is more profitable. However, the differences in costs
associated to each of these methods can make one of them more attractive than the
others.
In this paper, I elaborate a model to determine whether a monopolist produces
higher or lower quality goods when using buffet (all you can drink) pricing instead of
a two-part tariff. The model builds on the work of Nahata et al. (1999) who compare
a two-part tariff with buffet pricing, finding that transaction and production costs are
crucial to determine which of them is more profitable. According to these authors,
buffet pricing is attractive for the firm because it reduces transaction costs. For exam-
ple, in restaurants there is no need to have waiters taking orders, serving foods and
calculating bills. However, customers tend to eat more when they pay buffets than
paying for each unit they consume. Thus buffet pricing generates more consumption,
which in turn leads to higher production costs.
It turns out that transaction and production costs are again crucial to determine
whether a monopolist produces higher or lower quality goods when using buffet pric-
ing instead of a two-part tariff. On the one hand, the monopolist offers are higher
quality product when using buffet pricing instead of the alternative if transaction costs
1 One of the main reasons to ban “all you can drink” specials is simply to reduce alcohol consumption.
However, it is common to find an argument in alcohol laws about the importance of avoiding low quality
drinks in the article that bans “all you can drink” specials.
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are relatively high in comparison to production costs. On the other hand, it offers
a lower quality product if transaction costs are relatively low. This implies that the
more profitable strategy is usually associated with a higher quality good than the less
profitable strategy.
The intuition behind this result is simple. Firms use a two-part tariff or buffet pricing
instead of a uniform price because these pricing strategies allow them to extract at least
some part of consumer’s surplus. By definition, a high quality good generates more
surplus than a low quality good. It follows that a firm has more incentives to increase
quality when it uses the pricing strategy that extracts more surplus and, consequently,
generates more profits.
Since profits drive the pricing strategy decision, it follows that regulators should
not worry about quality most of the times. However, under certain cost conditions
buffet pricing is more profitable and leads to lower quality goods than a two-part
tariff. Although this result suggests that we should be concerned about quality when
a monopolist uses buffet pricing, forbidding this practice is not necessarily a solu-
tion to the low quality problem. Indeed, in certain cases it can have the opposite
effect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, I present background
information on quality regulation. In Sect. 3, I define and solve the model considering
separately a buffet pricing monopolist and a two-part tariff monopolist that serves one
consumer type. In Sect. 4, I compare profits and product quality choices under the
two pricing strategies. In Sect. 5, I extend the model to consider two consumer types.
Finally, in the last section I summarize the main results of this analysis.
2 Quality regulation
The literature about the economics of quality regulation builds on the early work of
Oi (1973) and Sheshinski (1976) who take two different approaches. On the one hand,
Oi analyzes regulation in regard to product safety. In particular, this author studies
the effect of imposing liability on producers over the sale of hazardous products. On
the other hand, Sheshinski studies the effects of regulation on the incentives that a
monopolist has to provide the socially efficient level of quality.
Although it is possible to find some studies like Besanko et al. (1987) in regard
to the provision of efficient levels of quality, most of the recent work is closer to the
approach of Oi. In this sense, Weisman (2005) says that regulators are more concerned
about quality deterioration as a result of regulation than with firms supplying ineffi-
cient levels of quality. In addition, Anderson and Enomoto (1987) explain that the
role of regulatory agencies assumed in the recent literature on quality regulation is
safeguarding and informing people about product quality.
According to Spence (1977) product failure itself is not sufficient to justify market
intervention. However, the fact that consumers are not properly informed about the
probability of failure attached to a given product calls for regulation. Spence explains
that the authority can regulate the market in regard to product failure in three different
forms. First, it can regulate the product directly. Second, it can provide information to
consumers. Third, it can impose liability on the producer.
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Direct regulation of a product or service usually implies setting minimum quality
standards and verifying that these standards are met by producers. For instance, in
Mexico the federal government is in charge of these two tasks regarding alcohol con-
sumption. On the one hand, the Secretaría de Salud issued norms 120 and 142 about
alcoholic drinks and establishments that sell food and drinks, respectively. On the
other hand, the regulatory agency that verifies that producers and products meet the
standards is Comisión Federal para la Protección de Riesgos Sanitarios (COFEPRIS).
Despite direct product regulation, local authorities ban “all you can drink” arguing
that it induces bars to serve low quality drinks. If this argument is true, there are at
least a couple of reasons that justify the behavior of local authorities. First, it seems
that direct regulation is not enough to protect consumers since COFEPRIS officials
say that 40% of alcoholic drinks sold in Mexico do not satisfy the norm.2 Second, it is
difficult for consumers and the authority to verify that drinks satisfy minimum quality
standards, while it is relatively easy to verify that bars are not using promotions like
“all you can drink”. Finally, even if the argument is not true and local legislators know
it, their real concern may be about excessive alcohol consumption, but prefer to be
perceived as opposing low quality rather than alcohol consumption.
3 Model
There is a monopolist, who is able to choose between a two-part tariff or buffet pricing.
The quality of the good produced by this firm is s > 0. It is assumed that marginal costs
are constant but depend on the pricing strategy and the quality of the good. Regardless
of its pricing strategy the marginal cost of production for this firm is c + s2. However,
if the firm decides to charge customers a per-unit price, which is one of the elements of
a two-part tariff, it must pay an additional marginal cost co > 0.3 Thus, the marginal
cost associated to buffet pricing is c+s2, while the marginal cost associated to per-unit
pricing is co + c + s2.
Consumers are identical, each of them with an individual demand given by the linear
function q (p, s) = s · (θ − p). Although the notation in this paper follows closely the
one used in the literature on monopoly and quality,4 it is important to emphasize that
this analysis is based on individual demands, while the work of Sheshinski (1976),
Spence (1975) and Spence (1976) considers market demand functions. Parameter
θ > 0 can be interpreted either as consumer’s reservation price or appetite. Holding
all other things constant, an increase in θ shifts out the individual’s demand curve.
This increases the consumer’s reservation price and its consumption. Similarly, higher
quality increases demand for the good. Finally, the price of the good is given by p ≥ 0
and it is understood that buffet pricing implies p = 0.
2 See the note: “Adulteradas, hasta 40% de las bebidas alcohólicas que se venden en el país” published by
Alma E. Muñoz in the newspaper La Jornada in December 6, 2005.
3 As mentioned earlier in the document, in order to charge customers per-unit the firm needs to offer
personalized attention.
4 As in Tirole (1988), quality is a characteristic of the good that increases its demand.
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It is important to note that the firm is able to choose quality regardless of the number
of consumers it serves or the pricing strategy that is used by the firm. In other words,
this analysis does not take into account that quality can be endogenous in this sense.
For instance, it can be argued that the absence of waiters or the fact that consum-
ers serve themselves makes buffet low quality. Similarly, it can also be argued, as in
Becker (1991), that eating at restaurants is a social activity and, consequently, that
consumers may prefer the ambience of a crowded restaurant than an empty one.
3.1 Buffet pricing
If the firm decides to use buffet pricing, it has to choose a fixed fee, E , taking into
account that customers will consume until they are satiated. In this case, the monop-
olist will try to set E as high as possible while satisfying the participation constraint.
Thus the firm maximizes
πb (E, s) = E −
(
c + s2
)
· q (0, s) subject to
q(0,s)∫
0
p (x, s) dx ≥ E . (1)
This problem can be simplified solving the integral of the inverse demand function
and substituting the demand function and the constraint into the equation. The profit
function in terms of quality is given by
πb(s) = sθ
2
2
−
(
c + s2
)
· sθ. (2)
The first term at the right-hand side of Eq. 2 is the buffet fee E , which is equivalent
to the consumer’s surplus. The second term is marginal cost times quantity considering
that the individual consumes until satiation.
The first order condition for profit maximization is
∂πb
∂s
= θ
2
2
− cθ − 3s2θ = 0. (3)
The solution is
sb =
√
θ − 2c
6
. (4)
Finally, maximized profits as a function of exogenous variables are given by
πb = θ
3
√
6
(θ − 2c) 32 (5)
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3.2 Two-part tariff
A two-part tariff combines a fixed fee and a per-unit price (Oi 1971). As explained in
Nahata et al., buffet pricing is an extreme case of a two-part tariff where the per-unit
price is equal to zero. If the firm uses a two-part tariff it chooses E , p and s to maximize
πt (E, p, s) = E + p · q (p, s) −
(
c + co + s2
)
· q (p, s) subject to
q(p,s)∫
0
p (x, s) dx ≥ E + p · q (p, s). (6)
Again, this problem can be simplified solving the integral and substituting the par-
ticipation constraint into the equation. The profit function in terms of production and
quality is given by
πt (q, s) = q2 ·
(
2θ − q
s
)
−
(
c + co + s2
)
· q. (7)
The first order conditions for profit maximization are
∂πt
∂q
= θ − c − co − s2 − q
s
= 0 (8)
and
∂πt
∂s
= q
2
2s2
− 2qs = 0. (9)
Solving the two equations simultaneously one obtains
qt = 45√5 (θ − c − co)
3
2 (10)
and
st =
√
θ − c − co
5
. (11)
Finally, maximized profits as a function of exogenous variables are given by
πt = 8
√
5
125
(θ − c − co) 52 (12)
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Fig. 1 Feasible costs set
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4 Analysis
None of the pricing strategies under analysis can be profitable if marginal costs are
prohibitively high. It is straightforward to note from Eqs. 5 and 12 that two technical
conditions must be satisfied for the two strategies to be profitable: θ > c + co and
θ > 2c. The first condition, which applies to per-unit pricing, says that production
and transaction marginal costs cannot be higher than consumers’ reservation price.
The second condition, which is related to buffet pricing, says that the consumers’
reservation price must be at least twice the size of the production marginal cost.
It is convenient to define a set of feasible transaction and production costs,
U = {(c, co) ∈ 2+ : c + co < θ and θ > 2c}. That is, a set that contains all the
points in the plane (c, co) that satisfy the two technical conditions I mentioned in the
previous paragraph. The shaded area in Fig. 1 represents this set.
I can also define f (c) : c → co as the iso-quality and g(c) : c → co as the iso-profit
functions for a given θ > 0. The graphs of these functions in the plane (c, co) repre-
sent points where the firm chooses equal quality or obtains equal profits, respectively,
regardless of whether it uses a two-part tariff or buffet pricing. It follows from Eqs. 4
and 11 that
f (c) = 1
6
(θ + 4c) . (13)
Similarly, it follows from Eqs. 5 and 12 that
g(c) = θ − c −
(
125θ
24
√
30
) 2
5
(θ − 2c) 35 . (14)
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Finally, it is worth showing that these functions have the following three properties:
Property 1 f (0) > g(0) for any θ > 0.
Proof It is not difficult to calculate
f (0) = 1
6
θ and g(0) =
(
1 −
(
125
24
√
30
) 2
5
)
θ ≈ 0.02θ.
Property 2 f
(
θ
2
)
= g
(
θ
2
)
for any θ > 0.
Proof It is not difficult to calculate
f
(
θ
2
)
= 1
2
θ = g
(
θ
2
)
.
Property 3 f (c) is linear and g(c) is convex for any
c ∈
[
0,
θ
2
]
.
Proof Note that
∂ f (c)
∂c
= 2
3
and
∂2 f (c)
∂c2
= 0,
while
∂g (c)
∂c
= −1 +
(
125θ
24
√
30
) 2
5 6
5 (θ − 2c) 25
and
∂2g (c)
∂c2
=
(
125θ
24
√
30
) 2
5 24
25 (θ − 2c) 75
> 0.
Figure 2 shows that the graphs of the iso-quality and iso-profit functions, f and
g partition the feasible set, U , into three regions. Let B be the region above the iso-
quality function, M the region between the two functions and T the region below the
iso-profit function.
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Fig. 2 Graphs of the iso-quality
and iso-profit functions, f and g
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In this model, I try to relate the quality of the good that the monopolist produces
with its pricing strategy choice. In order to establish the nature of this relationship, I
will make two comparisons. First, I will compare the monopolist’s maximized profits
under the two pricing strategies that I consider in this paper. Afterwards, I will try
to determine whether a monopolist using buffet pricing produces a higher or lower
quality good than a monopolist using a two-part tariff.
Proposition 1 The monopolist obtains higher (or lower) profits when it chooses buffet
pricing instead of a two-part tariff if co > g(c) (or co < g(c)).
Proof First I have to show that
co > g(c) = θ − c −
(
125θ
24
√
30
) 2
5
(θ − 2c) 35
implies πb > πt . Note that
co > θ − c −
(
125θ
24
√
30
) 2
5
(θ − 2c) 35
can be written, after some algebraic steps, as
(
125θ
24
√
30
) 2
5
(θ − 2c) 35 > θ − c − co.
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I can manipulate this expression to obtain
(
θ
3
√
6
)
(θ − 2c) 32 > 8
√
5
125
(θ − c − co) 52 .
It follows from Eqs. 5 and 12 that
πb =
(
θ
3
√
6
)
(θ − 2c) 32 > 8
√
5
125
(θ − c − co) 52 = πt .
The same procedure can be used to show that co < g(c) implies πb < πt . unionsq
This proposition is equivalent to the main result in Nahata et al. Of course, the intu-
itive explanation is also the same. Since the monopolist is able to avoid transaction
costs by choosing buffet pricing instead of a two-part tariff, it follows that buffet is
attractive from the firm’s point of view if transaction costs are relatively high in com-
parison to production costs. On the contrary, a two-part tariff is more attractive than a
buffet from the firm’s perspective if production costs are relatively high in comparison
to transaction costs because customers consume more when facing a buffet instead
of paying for each unit. I can also explain the result in Proposition 1 using Fig. 2. If
transaction and production costs fall in regions B or M , the monopolist will choose
buffet pricing. However, if the cost parameters fall in region T , the monopolist will
rather choose a two-part tariff.
Proposition 2 The monopolist produces a higher (or lower) quality good when it
chooses buffet pricing instead of a two-part tariff if co > f (c) (or co < f (c)).
Proof First I have to show that
co > f (c) = 16 (θ + 4c)
implies sb > st . Note that
co >
1
6
(θ + 4c)
can be written, after some algebraic steps, as
co > θ − c − 56θ +
10
6
c.
I can rearrange the terms to obtain
θ − 2c
6
>
θ − c − co
5
.
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It follows from Eqs. 4 and 11 that
sb =
√
θ − 2c
6
>
√
θ − c − co
5
= st .
The same procedure can be used to show that co < f (c) implies sb < st . unionsq
This proposition says that the relation between quality and the firm’s pricing choice
is ambiguous. Transaction and production costs are again crucial to determine whether
a monopolist produces higher or lower quality goods when using buffet pricing instead
of a two-part tariff. On the one hand, the monopolist offers a higher quality product
when using buffet pricing instead of the alternative if transaction costs are relatively
high in comparison to production costs. On the other hand, it offers a lower quality
product if transaction costs are relatively low. Again, I can use Fig. 2 to clarify this
result. If transaction and production costs fall in region B a buffet pricing monopolist
produces a higher quality good than a two-part tariff monopolist. However, if these
parameters fall in regions M or T , a two-part tariff monopolist produces a higher
quality good than a buffet pricing monopolist.
The intuition behind this result is simple. A monopolist uses a two-part tariff or
buffet pricing instead of a uniform price because these pricing strategies allow it to
extract at least some part of consumer’s surplus. By definition, a high quality good
generates more surplus than a low quality good. It follows that a firm has more incen-
tives to increase quality when it uses the pricing strategy that extracts more surplus
and, consequently, generates more profits.
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of a quality increase under the two pricing strategies in
the absence of transaction costs. The thick solid line is the demand curve of a represen-
tative individual, while the thick dotted line is the demand curve of the same individual
for a higher quality good. Originally, a two-part tariff monopolist will set the fixed fee
to extract all consumer’s surplus (i.e., A + B) and the price equal to marginal cost (i.e.,
c+s2). Thus profits equal A + B. On the other hand, the buffet pricing monopolist will
set the fee equal to A + B + C + F in order to extract all consumer surplus considering
that customers eat or drink until satiation. It follows that under buffet pricing profits
would be equal to A + B−G. Note that the inefficiency generated by buffet pricing is
equal to G. Furthermore, note that this inefficiency is the difference in profits between
a two-part tariff and buffet pricing.
Now consider an increase in the quality of the good. The horizontal thin dotted
line represents the new marginal costs. The profits of the firm using a two-part tariff
would now be equal to A + D. It follows that increasing quality is profitable for the
firm using this pricing strategy if D > B. That is, if the additional surplus generated by
increasing quality compensates a higher marginal cost. In contrast, the profits of the
firm using buffet pricing would be equal to A + D− I. Thus, the firm increases quality
if D > B + I−G. Since higher quality products generate more consumption and higher
marginal costs (that is, I > G), it follows that in the absence of transaction costs the
two-part tariff monopolist produces a higher quality good and is more profitable than
the buffet-pricing monopolist.
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Fig. 3 Demand curve and
quality
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Since transaction costs are avoided by choosing buffet pricing, the quality choice
and profits of a firm using this pricing strategy do not depend on transaction costs. On
the other hand, a two-part tariff monopolist reduces quality and profits as transaction
costs increase. Hence, the two-part tariff monopolist offers a lower quality good than
a buffet pricing monopolist if transaction costs are sufficiently high.
At this point, it is convenient to summarize the results obtained so far. I can combine
the two propositions and the properties of the iso-profit and iso-quality functions to
write the following.
Theorem 1 The iso-profit and iso-quality functions, g and f , respectively, partition
the feasible set, U , into three regions, B, M and T in Fig. 2, such that
(i) if (c, co) ∈ B then πb > πt and sb > st .
(ii) if (c, co) ∈ M then πb > πt and sb < st .
(iii) if (c, co) ∈ T then πb < πt and sb < st .
This theorem says that a buffet pricing monopolist is more profitable and offers a
higher quality good than a two-part tariff monopolist when the cost parameters fall in
region B. That is, when transaction costs are relatively high. It also says that a buffet
pricing monopolist is more profitable but offers a lower quality good than a two-part
tariff monopolist when the cost parameters fall in region M . Finally, it says that a
two-part tariff monopolist is more profitable and offers a higher quality good than a
buffet pricing monopolist when the cost parameters fall in region T . That is, when
transaction costs are relatively low.
According to the main theorem of this paper buffet pricing is not necessarily asso-
ciated with low quality goods. However, in certain cases it may lead to lower quality
than the one that would be expected under a two-part tariff. Since profits drive the
pricing strategy decision, regulators should not worry about quality if parameters fall
in regions B or T . In both cases, the more profitable strategy is associated with a higher
quality good than the less profitable strategy. However, regulators may be concerned
about quality if cost parameters fall in region M . In this particular case, a buffet pricing
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monopolist is more profitable and produces a lower quality good than a two-part tariff
monopolist.
Although we should be concerned about quality when a monopolist uses buffet
pricing, forbidding this practice is not necessarily a solution to the low quality prob-
lem. Indeed, under certain conditions it can have the opposite effect. Suppose that the
authority decides to ban buffet pricing and then consider the effect of this restriction on
quality in the three possible scenarios. If cost parameters fall in region T the restriction
is not relevant because the firm would freely choose a two-part tariff. On the other
hand, if cost parameters fall in region M the restriction would force the firm to choose
a two-part tariff instead of buffet pricing and lead to higher quality goods. Finally, if
parameters fall in region B, the restriction would force the firm to choose a two-part
tariff instead of buffet pricing but lead to lower quality goods.
5 Two consumer types
I can extend the model to compare buffet pricing and two-part tariff strategies when
there are different consumer types. Although this extension complicates the analysis,
I must say in advance that the main results of the paper do not change. In order to
keep the model tractable, I will consider two types of consumers equal in number but
with different reservation prices or appetite for the good or service provided by the
monopolist.
Assume that θi is the reservation price of consumer type i(= 1, 2). With out loss of
generality, suppose also that individual 1 is a low demand consumer, while individual
2 is a high demand consumer. Since the monopolist must choose whether to serve
both consumer types or consumer type 2 only (that is, the high demand consumer),
it is convenient to normalize the reservation price of consumer 1 to have θ1 = 1 and
θ2 = θ > 1. It follows that individual demand functions of consumers 1 and 2 would
now be q1 (p, s) = s · (1 − p) and q2 (p, s) = s · (θ − p), respectively. Note that the
analysis of the previous section applies directly to the case of a monopolist that serves
only the high demand consumers. Thus, in the rest of this section I will consider a
monopolist serving the two consumer types.
5.1 Buffet pricing
If the firm decides to use buffet pricing, it has to choose a fixed fee, E , taking into
account that customers will eat until they are satiated. In this case, the monopolist will
try to set E as high as possible while satisfying the participation constraint of the low
demand consumer. Thus the firm maximizes
π2b (E, s) = 2E −
(
c + s2
)
· (q1 (0, s) + q2 (0, s)) subject to
q1(0,s)∫
0
p (x, s) dx ≥ E . (15)
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This problem can be simplified solving the integral and substituting the participation
constraint and the demand function into the equation. It follows that
π2b (s) = s −
(
c + s2
)
· s (1 + θ) . (16)
The first order condition for profit maximization is
∂π2b
∂s
= 1 − cθ − 3s2 − 3s2θ = 0. (17)
The solution is
sb = 1√
3
√
1
1 + θ − c. (18)
Finally, maximized profits as a function of exogenous variables are given by
π2b =
2
√
3 (1 + θ)
9
(
1
1 + θ − c
) 3
2
(19)
5.2 Two-part tariff
If the firm decides to charge customers a two-part tariff, it chooses E , p and s taking
into a account that the low demand consumer must be willing to participate. That is,
the monopolist maximizes
π2t (E, p, s) = 2E + p · (q1 (p, s) + q2 (p, s))
−
(
c + co + s2
)
(q1 (p, s) + q2 (p, s))
subject to
q1(p,s)∫
0
p (x, s) dx ≥ E + p · q1 (p, s). (20)
Again, this problem can be simplified solving the integral and substituting the
participation constraint and the demand function into the equation. It follows that
π2t (q, s) = s (1 − p)2 +
(
p − c − co − s2
)
s (θ + 1 − 2p) . (21)
The first order conditions for profit maximization are
∂π2t
∂p
= s
(
2c − 1 − 2p + θ + 2co + 2s2
)
= 0 (22)
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and
∂π2t
∂s
= p − c + 2cp − cθ + pθ − co + 2pco − θco − 2p2 − 3s2 + 6ps2 − 3s2θ
+ (1 − p)2 = 0. (23)
In order to simplify the price, quality and profits expressions, I can set φ (c, co, θ)
in terms of exogenous variables as follows
φ (c, co, θ) =
√
11 + 10θ − 5θ2 + 16 · (c + co) · (c + co − 2). (24)
Solving Eqs. 22 and 23 simultaneously I obtain
pt = 4 · (c + co) + 5θ + 1 − φ10 (25)
and
st =
√
6 · (1 − c − co) − φ
10
. (26)
Finally, maximized profits are given by
π2t =
8 · (c + co) · (c + co − 2) − 10θ + 5θ2 + 13 + 2 · (1 − c − c0) · φ
25
×
√
6 · (1 − c − co) − φ
10
. (27)
5.3 Analysis
The first step in the analysis is to define a set of feasible transaction and production
costs considering that the two consumer types are served under both pricing schemes.
Formally, the feasible set is U2 = {(c, co) ∈ 2+ : π2b > πb and π2t > πt }. In other
words, a set that contains all the points in the plane (co, c) such that serving two
consumer types is more profitable than serving only one consumer type under both
pricing schemes. The second step is to define the iso-quality and iso-profit functions,
considering that the firm serves both consumer types. Let f2(c) : c → co be the
iso-quality and g2(c) : c → co the iso-profit functions, respectively.
Since Eqs. 5 and 19 are relatively simple, I can calculate the border of the feasible
set where profits are higher serving two consumer types than one consumer type under
buffet pricing. That is,
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Fig. 4 Graphs of the iso-quality
and iso-profit functions for
θ = 1.1
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(28)
Similarly, I can use Eqs. 18 and 26 to calculate the iso-quality function
f2(c) = 1 − 11 + θ −
1
2
√
2θ − θ2 + 16
9
(
1
1 + θ − c
)2
− 1. (29)
On the other hand, due to the complexity of Eq. 27 I will compute the graph of
the other border of the feasible set and the graph of the iso-profit function, g2(c),
numerically for a given θ .
Figure 4 shows that the graphs of the iso-quality and iso-profit functions, f2 and g2
partition the new feasible set, U2, into three regions for θ = 1.1. The dotted lines are
the borders of the feasible set. Keeping the notation used in the previous analysis, B
is the region above the iso-quality function, M the region between the two functions
and T the region below the iso-profit function.
Note that the main theorem of the paper applies when the firm serves two consumer
types, at least for certain values of parameter θ . Again, this theorem says that a buffet
pricing monopolist is more profitable and offers a higher quality good than a two-part
tariff monopolist when the cost parameters fall in region B. It also says that a buffet
pricing monopolist is more profitable but offers a lower quality good than a two-part
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tariff monopolist when the cost parameters fall in region M . Finally, it says that a
two-part tariff monopolist is more profitable and offers a higher quality good than a
buffet pricing monopolist when the cost parameters fall in region T .
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I elaborated a model to determine whether a monopolist produces higher
or lower quality goods when using buffet (all you can drink) pricing instead of a two-
part tariff. According to the main theorem of this paper buffet pricing is not necessarily
associated with low quality goods. It turns out that the relation between transaction
and production costs is crucial to determine which pricing strategy leads the firm to
produce higher quality goods. If I compare the quality of the products under buffet
pricing and a two-part tariff, I find that the monopolist offers a higher quality product
when using buffet pricing if transaction costs are relatively high in comparison to
production costs. On the other hand, it offers a lower quality product if transaction
costs are relatively low.
Usually the more profitable strategy is associated with a higher quality good than
the less profitable strategy. Since profits drive the pricing strategy decision, it follows
that regulators should not worry about quality most of the times. However, under cer-
tain cost conditions buffet pricing is more profitable and leads to lower quality goods
than a two-part tariff. Bars offering “all you can drink”, the case that motivated this
paper, appears to be a good example illustrating lower quality under buffet pricing.
Since transaction costs are relatively low in comparison to production costs, the main
result of the paper suggests that bars offer low quality drinks when they use “all you
can drink” specials. Banning “all you can drink” may be justified if it is difficult for
the authority to regulate quality directly or the consumer is not well informed about
the quality of drinks. For instance, if bars tend to serve non-bottled alcoholic drinks
when they use this type of promotion.
Although this “all you can drink” case suggests that there should be a concern about
quality, forbidding the practice is not necessarily a solution to the low quality problem.
Indeed, in certain cases it can have the opposite effect.
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